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1. INTRODUCTION
Inter-agent communication is the most common means by which autonomous agents
cooperate, coordinate, and negotiate. To this end, such agents are typically equipped
with a particular agent communication language (ACL). This language deﬁnes the set of
communication primitives (both syntax and semantics) that the agents can either generate or
receive during their social exchanges. In systems in which there is a single authority that has
complete control over the design and implementation of all the agents, achieving meaningful
interoperationisnotoverlyproblematic.However,whennosuchauthorityexists,whichisthe
case for many of the applications for which agents are best suited (Jennings 2000), effective
communication is more difﬁcult to achieve. To date, there have been two broad approaches
toaddressingthisproblem.Theﬁrstistodeﬁneastandardforagentcommunicationandthen
dictate that all the agents must adhere to it (examples of such standards include FIPA-ACL
(FIPA 2000) and KQML (Labrou and Finin 1997)). The second is to assume there is no
existing communication language and to allow the agents to generate one for themselves
(e.g., Steels and Kaplan 1999). Both of these approaches have their respective drawbacks,
however. In the former case, the need to be encompassing means that many of the primitives’
deﬁnitionsarenotwellsuitedtoexpressingtheagent’scommunicationneedsintheparticular
situation in which it ﬁnds itself. Also an agent has no means of checking at run-time the
precise semantics being used by the agent with which it is communicating (it simply has to
assume they are conforming to the standard). In the latter case, convergence to a set of usable
primitives can be extremely slow and it is a process that must be repeated for each new agent
that is encountered. To overcome both sets of shortcomings, we advocate a hybrid approach
in which the agents dynamically negotiate the precise semantics of their communication
primitives according to their prevailing needs using a systematic multidimensional frame-
work. We term the framework the semantic space of the communication primitives (since it
represents the range of possible semantics that the primitives may take) and the process of
setting the semantics of the primitives as semantic ﬁxing (since it involves negotiation about
the meaning of the primitives and, eventually, an agreement about their meaning).
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The motivating hypothesis behind this work is that there are no deﬁnitive (absolute) deﬁ-
nitionsofagentcommunicationprimitivesthatareuniversallyapplicable.Thus,itisdesirable
for agents to have the ability to deﬁne and agree upon the semantics at run-time according
to their prevailing interaction needs. Since the agents are autonomous, and typically repre-
sent different stakeholders, the process by which they come to an agreement will necessarily
be some form of negotiation since the agreement must be one that is mutually acceptable
(Jennings et al. 2001; Walton and Krabbe 1995). Without a systematic underpinning frame-
work to guide this negotiation process, however, the cost of reaching such agreements would
be prohibitively expensive.
Against this background, the contribution of this work can be viewed as twofold. First,
we introduce the notion of semantic space and provide a systematic framework for deﬁning
primitiveswithinit.Asemanticspaceprovidesamultidimensionalstructurewithinwhichall
potentialcommunicationprimitivescanbelocated.Thus,ratherthanviewingcommunication
primitivesasbeingarrangedinsomerigidtaxonomywhosesemanticsareﬁxedatdesigntime,
weexplicitlyacknowledgethat(seeminglysubtle)variationsinthemeaningofaprimitivecan
make a signiﬁcant difference to its efﬁcacy in a given encounter. For this reason we believe
thesemeaningsshouldbedecidedatrun-timesothattheycanbetailoredtoreﬂecttheagent’s
current context. In more detail, all ACL primitives can be thought of as identifying a single
point or a region in semantic space, regardless of the tradition, scheme or library of which
they form a part. The distribution of primitives in semantic space is not even but clumpy,
with primitives occurring in clusters. Thus, for example, the commissive acts deﬁned within
the FIPA, KQML, and KAoS speciﬁcations would lie close together in a region of semantic
space (though would not be at exactly the same point—see Section 3 for more details) and
thisclusterwouldberelativelydistantfromaclusterrepresentingaselectionofassertiveacts
suchasFIPA’sinformandKQML ’stell—seeSection2foramoredetaileddiscussionofthese.
The concept of semantic space extends the parsimonious approach of Hindriks et al. (2000),
in which a small number of basic primitives can be composed to produce (epiphenomenally)
a range of speech acts, such as are provided by KQML or FIPA. The approach advocated
by Hindriks et al. will allow access, by composition, to a large portion of semantic space,
but is inevitably unable to characterize the entire space. The approach would be unable, for
example, to capture both KQML and FIPA variants of an inform.
Thesecondcontributionofthisworkisthatweoutlineamechanismbywhichagentscan
usethesemanticspaceframeworktonegotiatethemeaningoftheircommunicationprimitives
according to the type of dialog in which they are engaged. The method that we advocate for
thissemanticﬁxingisasimplevotingmechanism.Inparticular,wemotivatethischoicefrom
among the range of potential negotiation mechanisms, we describe the assumptions that are
necessary for this approach to operate and we describe a speciﬁc operational protocol that is
appropriate for this task.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 uses probably the most
familiar type of communicative act—the assertive—to illustrate the fundamental differences
that exist between the speciﬁcations provided by existing agent communication languages.
The examples used are based on three prominent, yet fundamentally different, ACLs. Our
purpose here is to highlight the fact that each deﬁnition, when viewed in isolation, appears
reasonable; however it is impossible to say that any one of them is “correct” and that the
others are “wrong.” Rather, each deﬁnition is suitable for agents interacting in different
contexts. With this motivation, Section 3 presents an analysis of some of the key dimensions
of semantic space with a focus on the types of move made in the establishment of contracts
between agents. The reason for this focus is that the negotiation of contracts is of particular
importance to both the current efforts in specifying agent communication languages and in
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discussed and the simple voting mechanism is detailed; an example of which is examined in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses the many issues raised by our approach and relates our work
to that of others in the ﬁeld. Finally, Section 7 concludes the article and outlines the avenues
of further work.
2. EXAMPLE: ASSERTIVES IN SEMANTIC SPACE
To provide an example of disparate primitives in a uniform semantic space, three closely
related primitives are here characterized in terms of the FIPA SL—the Semantic Language
used to specify the communicative acts of FIPA-ACL. The use of the FIPA SL is not crucial
to the exposition, which could equally employ some other, possibly novel, language. The
choice is expedient simply because the formalism is already available and familiar, and
intuitive explanations of the modalities and abbreviations used in FIPA SL are given where
necessary. The example adopted is that of the assertives: inform (FIPA 2000), tell (Labrou
andFinin1997)andINF(Smithetal.1998).Forthesakeofclarity,throughouttheremainder
of the article the deﬁnitions of primitives in these three ACLs are speciﬁed and discussed
using a common set of terms to denote states (p, q, etc.), actions (a, a , etc.) and agents
(i, j, etc.).
ThefullFIPAdeﬁnitionofinformisgiveninDeﬁnition1.Notethatthisincludescompo-
nentswhichareomittedfromtheFIPAsummary,includingtheintentionaleffect—property4
(FIPA 2000, p. 49). In the case of inform, the intentional effect is the second “rational effect”
(RE) given in Deﬁnition 1: the recipient, j, believes that the sender, i, intends that j believe
p. This deﬁnition (and Deﬁnitions 2b and 3b) also specify a set of “feasibility preconditions”
(FPs) that state the circumstances in which, by performing the act, the rational effects may
be established.1
< i,inform( j, p) > (1)
FP: Bi p ∧¬ Bi(Bifj p ∨ Uifj p) ∧¬ BiBj p
 
 
n>1
¬ABn,i,jBi p
  
 
n>2
¬ABn,i,jBj p
 
RE: Bj p ∧ BjIiBj p
tell(i, j, p) (2a)
Pre(i): bel(i, p) ∧ know(i,want( j,know( j,q)))
Pre( j): intend( j,know( j,q))
Post(i): know(i,know( j,bel(i, p)))
Post( j): know( j,bel(i, p))
< i,tell( j, p) > (2b)
FP: Bi p ∧ BiCjBifj p ∧ IjBifj p
RE: BiBjBi p ∧ BjBi p
1Modality B indicates belief and is a KD45 modal operator (Chellas 1980). Bifi p abbreviates Bi p ∨ Bi¬p. Uifi p abbre-
viates Ui p ∨ Ui¬p, where Ui p represents agent i being uncertain about the truth condition of p but that p is more likely than
¬p. ABn,i,j represents the belief of agent i about the belief of agent j, etc., to a level of nesting n. Finally, I denotes intention,
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The closest equivalent—the primitive employed for assertive communication—in
KQML is tell. The deﬁnition, from (Labrou and Finin 1997), is given in Deﬁnition 2a, and a
translation into the FIPA SL in Deﬁnition 2b.2 The preconditions of sender, i, and recipient,
j,i nD e ﬁnition 2a map onto the feasibility preconditions in Deﬁnition 2b. Similarly, the
postconditions of sender, i, and recipient, j,i nD e ﬁnition 2a map onto the rational effects
in Deﬁnition 2b—communicative act postconditions (in KQML) and the rational effect of a
communicativeact(inFIPAACL)areequivalentnotions.Itis,however,importanttopointout
that,toparaphrasetheFIPAspeciﬁcationdocument(FIPA2000,p.31),“[an]agentwillselect
acts based on the relevance of the act’s expected outcome or rational effect to its goals[, but]
it cannot assume that the rational effect will necessarily result from sending the message.”
This is, of course, true for any action that an agent may perform in a nondeterministic
environment, even if it is, arguably, a more pervasive issue in agent communication.
There are a number of comments and caveats regarding this translation of the KQML
tell. It should be noted that the languages offered in the two works are signiﬁcantly different;
there is not always a simple one-to-one translation between them. In particular, justiﬁcation
is required for this translation of bel and know. The bel operator is used when reference
is being made to a sentence in the knowledge representation language of a particular agent,
whereas know is used when reference is made to an abstract cognitive state. This is useful
if it is important to make explicit the fact that agents may not share the same knowledge
representation, but in this article they are treated as equivalent. The know operator is also
used to refer to some q in Pre(i) and Pre( j). This q can be either bel( j, p)o r¬bel( j, p)
and, because we make no distinction between know and bel, know( j,q) can simply be
translated as Bifj p.
The aim, however, is not to provide a rigorous intertranslation, but rather, to capture the
spiritoftheprimitivesandtoinvestigatetheirdifferencesatthatabstractlevel.Giventhisaim,
it is also instructive to examine the work of Cohen and Levesque (C&L) (1990) and Smith
et al. (1998) on agent communication in the same way, despite the fact that their deﬁnitions
are in terms of denotational, rather than operational semantics. Deﬁnition 3a summarizes the
deﬁnition of inform used in the KAoS system (Smith et al. 1998),3 a FIPA SL translation is
offered in Deﬁnition 3b.
INF(i, j,e, p)
def = BEL(i,¬BMB( j,i, p)) ∧ (3a)
GOAL(i,HAPPENS(i,e;✸BMB( j,i, p)?)) ∧
INT(i,e;BMB( j,i,BEL(i, p)))
< i,inf( j, p) > (3b)
FP: Bi
 
 
n>1
¬ABn,j,i p
 
∧ CiPossible
 
 
n>1
ABn,j,i p
 
∧ Ii
 
 
n>1
ABn,j,iBi p
 
RE:
 
n>1
ABn,j,i p
2Ci p represents i’s desire that p holds.
3A different notation is used for the sake of consistency within this article; (Smith et al. 1998) use a Lisp-like notation,
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Again, there are several comments on the translation. Some aspects are reasonably
straightforward: the use of an inﬁnite conjunction for mutual belief is in direct accordance
with Cohen and Levesque’s (1990, p. 232) deﬁnition, and the HAPPENS operator can be
captured reasonably well using SL ’s Feasible operator, upon which Possible is deﬁned as
Possible(p) ≡ (∃a)Feasible(a, p). The most important liberty taken in this translation is
to conﬂate Cohen and Levesque’s notion of the ‘minimum acceptable result’ into the ratio-
nal effect. Thus, in the example above, the minimum acceptable result is that the speaker
and hearer mutually believe that the speaker believes the content of the utterance—i.e.,
BMB( j,i,BEL(i, p)). Because FIPA does not explicitly formalize any equivalent of an
‘attempt’withinitssemantics,andcannotthereforedistinguishbetweenanultimategoaland
a minimum acceptable result, the rational effect is taken to be the satisfaction of the ultimate
goal of the utterance. The intention to achieve the minimum acceptable result and the ulti-
mategoalareincludedinthefeasibilitypreconditions.AlthoughBMB( j,i,BEL(i, p))isnot
aprioriderivablefromBMB( j,i, p),thedifferenceliesinABEL(n, j,i,BEL(i, p))foreven
values of n—i.e., BjBiBi p, BjBiBjBiBi p, and so on, in our SL translation. Although these
do not follow directly from
 
n>1 ABn,j,i p, FIPA SL is a KD45 logic, so they can be con-
cluded by introspection. Thus the rational effect need include only the BMB( j,i, p) clause.
In effect, for the purposes of investigating the character of the primitives, we are assuming
that communication is reliable (fallibility handling would be captured on yet further axes of
semantic space). Finally, Cohen and Levesque’s GOAL operator needs to be translated as
the FIPA SL Ci modality, because the selection of the primitive (by FIPA property 1) rests
upon an extant intention of achievement of the rational effect. Thus a communicative act a
with rational effect p, is only selected if the agent holds Ii p; therefore, including Ii p as a
feasibility precondition would be vacuous.
Deﬁnitions 1, 2b, and 3b each purport to capture an assertive communicative act. Yet
clearly, they differ from one another along many axes. The ﬁrst, and perhaps most obvious,
is that FIPA and KQML explicitly demand sincerity: Bi p is a precondition in both deﬁni-
tions. For Cohen and Levesque, no such requirement is imposed. Instead, they explain that
sincerity may be derivable from agents’ mental states in particular circumstances, but is not
ubiquitous. Pitt and Mamdani (2000) discuss a number of examples that mitigate against
the blanket adoption of sincerity, but whichever point is selected on this particular binary
dimension in semantic space, it is clearly crucial that agents involved have a common un-
derstanding of it. A second dimension of difference between these three examples is what
might be termed ‘level of success’ in the outcome. FIPA is perhaps the most optimistic,
since it includes Bj p—that the hearer does, in fact, believe the content of the inform. Next
is the C&L act, which (if successful) leads to the speaker’s belief that speaker and hearer
mutually believe. Finally, the most pessimistic is KQML, which captures the hearer’s be-
lief that the speaker believes the content of the utterance (the hearer believes the speaker
is sincere), and the speaker’s belief that that is what the hearer believes (the speaker be-
lieves the hearer will trust it). This dimension has many more points—from full, bilateral
mutual belief, down to nothing more than very weak nested constructs, such as FIPA’s inten-
tional effect (the hearer recognizes the speaker’s intention to effect belief change). Crucially,
each point along this scale seems reasonable in a given context—in tightly knit, reliable,
trustworthy relationships, shifting to bilateral mutual belief with a single utterance might
be highly cost effective. In contrast, a more loosely coupled, unreliable, possibly new re-
lationship might demand greater caution in the conclusions to be drawn from an inform.
Again, though, agents need to be aware of the precise nature of the inform that they are
employing.
This example, contrasting the different conceptions of assertives, illustrates how indi-
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semantics. This shows that, although one assertive may seem to be, intuitively, no different
from any other, a deeper investigation may reveal subtle distinctions. Moreover, it is simply
not possible to say which of these is “correct” and which is “wrong.” Given this, the follow-
ing section presents an analysis of three of the main dimensions of the semantic space of
communicative acts.
3. MAPPING SEMANTIC SPACE
The key argument of this article is that the mapping of semantic space provides a means
to systematically analyze inter-agent communication. To cover the range of possible com-
munication primitives, this space needs to be highly multidimensional—the above analysis
of assertives illustrates this—although not all of the dimensions will be relevant to all types
of primitives. Our purpose, then, in this section is to focus on three of the dimensions and to
focus on primitives that are concerned with making contracts. Our aim is not to exhaustively
detail all the dimensions, nor to show how other types of communication primitive can map
into the semantic space structure we propose (both these activities are worthy longer-term
goals, but they fall beyond the scope of this article).
It is worth noting at this point that we assume that there are no dependencies between
the dimensions of semantic space (hence the use of the term dimension). Having said this,
a number of theories of agency do rely on constraints between modalities such as belief and
intention (Grosz and Kraus 1996; Panzarasa et al. 2001), but this is to do with the model
of a particular agent rather than the model of communicative acts that agents use. It could
be the case that the agent’s internal model precludes the use of a particular communicative
act speciﬁcation that exists within semantic space, but this doesn’t mean that semantic space
should be restricted in this way.
The dimensions we focus on refer to a single agent and a single proposition. Conversely,
if an agent is not permitted to bring about p and some authority (possibly some other agent)
permits it to do so, its freedom to act toward that proposition is increased. Such moves are
especially critical during the negotiation of contracts between agents (Norman et al. 1998).
These commissive and permissive moves serve to decrease and increase the freedom
of an agent toward some proposition respectively. For these reasons, two of the dimensions
considered employ Lindahl’s jurisprudential analysis of normative positions (1977) since it
is the normative position of an agent that characterizes its freedom toward a proposition.4
The ﬁrst dimension characterizes the preconditions in the semantics of a primitive, and the
second is used to deﬁne its postconditions. The third dimension relates to belief and, as the
discussionisrestrictedtochangesinnormativeposition,willappearonlyinthepreconditions
of a primitive.
3.1. Normative Positions
In this section we concentrate on the ﬁrst two dimensions. These characterize how the
normativepositionofasingleagentchangesastheresultofacommunicativeact:thenorma-
tive position speciﬁed in the preconditions is replaced by that speciﬁed in the postconditions
of the act. Lindahl’s model speciﬁes seven distinct points on each axis. Using the modality
P to refer to permission and Ei p to refer to agent i bringing about the state of affairs p,a
4For a more detailed analysis of normative positions and their uses in the speciﬁcation of computing systems, see Sergot
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FIGURE 1. Hasse diagram representing Lindahl’s seven one-agent types of normative position for a single
agent, i and a single proposition, p. A shaded top-left segment indicates that the agent, i is permitted to bring
about the state of affairs, p: PE i p. A shaded top-right segment indicates that i is permitted to bring about ¬p:
PE i¬p. A shaded bottom segment indicates that i is permitted to remain passive towards the state of affairs p:
P(¬Ei p ∨¬ Ei¬p). Unshaded segments indicate that i is not so permitted: i is forbidden.
single normative position may be composed from a permutation of the following and their
negation:
1. permission to bring about p: PE i p;
2. permission to bring about ¬p: PE i¬p;o r
3. permission to remain passive toward p: P(¬Ei p ∨¬ Ei¬p).
The logic of the E operator is one of successful action: it includes the axiom schema
Ei p → p and the rule of inference if   p ↔ q then   Ei p ↔ Eiq. Lindahl (1977), in fact,
uses the notation Do(i, p) for Ei p—the latter notation adopted here follows that used by
Jones and Sergot (1996). P can be read “it is permitted that” and it is the dual of O,o r“it
is obligatory that,” i.e., Op ≡¬ P¬p. The logic of O contains the rule of inference if   p
then   Op, and the axiom schemas O(p → q) → (Op → Oq) and Op →¬ O¬p. Again,
Lindahl uses a different notation: Shall and May rather than O and P respectively.
One possible legal position, T1, represents complete freedom (an agent is permitted to
bring about p, to bring about ¬p, or to do nothing to p at all), and another position, T5,
represents a speciﬁc obligation (permitted to bring about p, but not permitted to bring about
¬portoremainpassive).Thesevendistincttypescanbearrangedasapartialordering,shown
in Figure 1 (reproduced from Lindahl (1977)), from complete freedom (at the bottom), to
maximal restriction (at the top).
The arcs in Figure 1 represent potential communicative actions. Moving from T1 to T2,
for example, represents a communicative exchange which decreases the freedom of i (from
complete freedom toward p, to a restriction whereby i may not bring about ¬p). There
are thus nine legitimate primitive communicative actions that reduce an agent’s freedom
(traversing arcs upward), and nine more that increase its freedom (traversing downward).
This represents a subset of all those that are possible: a designer of an agent system may
wish agents to be able to move from any one of the seven positions to any other in a single
communication exchange. Thus the initial and resultant Lindahl states can be seen as distinct
axes in semantic space, offering, in this plane, 42 possible primitives that effect a change in
the normative position of the agent. This space, and the eighteen primitive moves mentioned,
are shown in Figure 2.236 COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
FIGURE 2. Primitive normative position movements (for commissives, X, and permissives, O) for a single
agent, i, and a single proposition, p.
A point in this space can be identiﬁed with a particular communication action. Thus,
for example, (1,4) represents agent i’s committing to not bringing about p, from an initial
position of complete freedom toward p (a movement from T1 to T4).5 Furthermore, a single
utterance may constitute (by underspeciﬁcation) a move from any number of start states to
any number of ﬁnal states. Thus, the set of points, {(2,5), (3,5)} represents a communicative
action which commits agent i to bringing about p, specifying only the restriction that the
agent is not so committed at the start state, but which still conforms to the primitive moves
speciﬁed in Figure 1. Of course, as recognized by Lindahl, there is no requirement that a
communicative action should constitute a primitive move, so a communicative action which
simply introduces a commitment on i to bring about p would be represented by the set of
points {(1,5), (2,5), (3,5), (4,5), (6,5), (7,5)}.6
Itisimportanttorecognizethatasinglecommunicativeactionmaycorrespondtoaregion
of semantic space, rather than just a point. In fact, this idea is implicit in the construction of
semantic space itself, because it is unlikely that every primitive will be precisely speciﬁed on
everyaxis.Axesconcerningpermission,forexample,areveryinfrequentlylikelytobeuseful
in requesting, so many deﬁnitions of requests may range over all possible points on those
axes. But as demonstrated above, communicative acts may also range noncontiguously over
subsets of points on particular axes. This accords well with intuition about communication
action,becausesomeactionsaremoregeneralthanothers.InFIPA,forexample,thequery-if
communicative act is deﬁned in terms of the more general request and inform primitives.
3.2. Committing to Bring about p
To demonstrate how semantic space, including those dimensions introduced in the pre-
vious section, can be populated by distinct, useful communicative acts, the act of committing
5The origin is taken to be (1,1) indicating a reﬂexive move from normative position T1 to T1.
6The reﬂexive move (5,5) is not included in this set, but it could be justiﬁed if an agent may commit to bringing about p
when it is already so committed. Thus the intensional state and extensional one-agent state remains unchanged, but there may,
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tobringaboutastateofaffairs p isconsidered.Theassumptionmadeisthattherationaleffect
of this act is that the speaker moves to the Lindahl state T5. It is worth noting here that the
speaker is, in some way, committed to the hearer to bring about p after this communicative
act. The key issue for such an act, however, is that the speaker is committed to act toward
the achievement of the goal p. The hearer can, therefore, assume that after this commu-
nicative act is performed, the speaker is so committed.7 Other types of commissive act are,
of course, also possible. For example, an agent can commit to remain passive toward the
state of affairs p regardless of whether p holds or not—a normative state of affairs that may
be useful in many applications. The reason for focusing on acts that result in the speaker
being in state T5 is that this is the most common commissive act considered by designers
of ACLs.
BeforespeciﬁcexamplesfromFIPA,KQML,andKAoSarediscussed,thereareanumber
ofissuesthatareimportantinselectingtheregionofsemanticspacethatdeﬁnesthesemantics
of a particular commissive act. These include the third dimension of semantic space that is
considered in this article: whether or not the agent concerned believes that the proposition
holds (it is assumed that, unlike its normative state, the agent’s belief in the proposition is
unchanged). Each of these dimensions refer to a single agent and a single proposition.8 The
issues that are considered in this section that are relevant to commissive acts that result in
the speaker entering normative position T5 are:
1. Whetherornotthespeakeriscommittedto p priortotheperformanceofthecommissive
act.
2. Whether or not the speaker is a priori forbidden from bringing about the state of affairs
p.
3. Whether or not the speaker believes that p holds.
FIPA’s accept-proposal is “the action of accepting a previously submitted proposal to
perform an action,” and so must be viewed in the context of the semantics of a proposal. The
k e yF Po ft h epropose primitive is that if the speaker, i, believes that the hearer, j, intends
that i perform the act then i will intend to perform the act. An acceptance of a proposal
(the accept-proposal primitive) is then simply the communication by j of its intention
that i performs the act. This is as close as FIPA gets to a commissive act: a sequence of
two specialized assertives. In combination, however, this short dialog results in the original
proposer having the intention to perform the act.9 The closest we can get to a mapping
from this short dialog to the region of semantic space discussed in this article is that in the
initial state (prior to the proposal being issued) the proposer may be in any one of the seven
normative positions and in the ﬁnal state (after the proposal is accepted) the proposer is in
the normative position T5. The FIPA speciﬁcation allows the agent making the commitment
to be so committed prior to the acceptance of the proposal, it may be a priori forbidden from
achieving the goal, and the goal may already be achieved. There is, therefore, no restriction,
according to the criteria discussed above, on the circumstances in which a FIPA-compliant
agent can commit to activity.
7See Wooldridge (2000) for a discussion of the veriﬁcation of inter-agent communication.
8An obvious extension to this three dimensional semantic space is to consider the normative positions (before and after
the act) and the epistemic state of the hearer—resulting in six dimensions of semantic space being considered. This is discussed
in Section 6.
9This can be derived from the semantics of propose and accept-proposal and the property of SL that states |= ψ ⇔ Biψ
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Using the notation that Tn(i, p) refers to an agent, i, in a normative position, Tn, with
respect to p, a commissive act that captures the spirit of FIPA’s propose-accept-proposal may
be deﬁned as follows:
< i,FIPA-commit( j, p) >
FP: T1(i, p)∨T2(i, p)∨T3(i, p)∨T4(i, p)∨T5(i, p)∨T6(i, p)
∨T7(i, p)
RE: T5(i, p)
In common with FIPA, KQML does not include commissive acts within its speciﬁcation.
The canonical example, however, for establishing some kind of contractual agreement be-
tween agents is an achieve-tell sequence. The achieve represents a request from an agent i
to an agent j to bring about some state of affairs, p, in the world. The tell offered in response
by j can then either be acknowledgment that p has been brought about (or has failed to be
brought about), or can indicate an intention to bring about p. It is the latter case that is of
interest since the former barely represents a contract at all. To use Labrou and Finin’se x -
ample, i issues the performative achieve(i, j,torque(motor1,5)). To express j’s intention
to conform to this request, j may reply with tell( j,i,intend( j,torque(motor1,5))). It is,
therefore, this tell which commits j to performing an action appropriate to bringing about
the state of affairs torque(motor1,5), since tell includes sincerity as a precondition.10 The
preconditions of the achieve include that j does not already intend to bring about the state
of affairs; and the tell requires j to intend to bring it about. This suggests that the area of
semantic space being identiﬁed is the set of points (in the Lindahl plane) of the preconditions
being any normative position except T5, and postcondition being T5—in Figure 2, the set of
points {(1,5), (2,5), (3,5), (4,5), (6,5), (7,5)}. According to the KQML speciﬁcation, there-
fore, an agent may commit to achieving a goal that it is forbidden from achieving, or that has
already been achieved. It may not, however, commit to a goal it is already committed to. A
commissive act that captures the spirit of KQML ’s achieve-tell may be deﬁned as follows:
< i,KQML-commit( j, p) >
FP: T1(i, p)∨T2(i, p)∨T3(i, p)∨T4(i, p)∨T6(i, p)∨T7(i, p)
RE: T5(i, p)
There are two problems with the analyses of these FIPA and KQML exchanges. In the
ﬁrst place, both deﬁnitions rest upon a complex of primitives, rather than upon the semantics
of a singular performative. In the case of FIPA, a propose-accept-proposal sequence, and,
in the case of KQML, an achieve-tell sequence. The second problem is in what is lost in
the analysis, and in particular the binding between the two agents (in both cases). The result
of the accept-proposal (in FIPA) is that both agents intend that the proposer perform the
action concerned. The result of the tell (in KQML) is that both agents know that one intends
to bring about the speciﬁed state of affairs—although there is no restriction on the action of
the agent that has not committed to act, cf. Norman et al. (1998). To capture this result, the
modelofsemanticspaceneedstobereﬁnedtodetailLindahl’stwo-agenttypes,inwhichsuch
reciprocityiselegantlyhandled.ThisreﬁnementofthemodelisdiscussedinSections4and6.
The conﬁrm act in the KAoS system (Smith et al. 1998) is an inform of a PWAG; i.e., an
agent expressing either a PGOAL (persistent goal—Cohen and Levesque’s (1990) notion of
intention) to bring about some state of affairs p, or, if that cannot happen (p is already true,
10The other primary means for this type of commitment to be incurred is through an advertize, though the dynamics of
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can never be true, or the relativizing condition, q, fails) a PGOAL to bring about mutual
belief that p cannot happen. In the most straightforward case, then, a conﬁrm act entails a
PGOAL toward a state of affairs.
To deﬁne a formal mapping between the semantics used to deﬁne communicative acts
in the KAoS language and a semantics for Lindahl deontic and action modalities is beyond
the scope of this article; again, our aim is to investigate the spirit of the communicative
acts, and to determine their location on at least some of the axes of semantic space. With
this caveat in mind, the PGOAL represents a specialization of OE i p (normative position
T5). That is, since we are not here concerned with issues such as sanctions and contrary-
to-duty obligations, a PGOAL can be seen as one speciﬁc operationalization of an agent’s
commitment to bring about a state of affairs. Thus the KAoS act conﬁrm occupies only
point T5 along the Lindahl-postcondition axis (all other points are prohibited by the strong
commitment captured in a PGOAL by which passivity with respect to p and permission to
bring about ¬p are excluded).
Althoughthiscommunicativeact’spositiononthepostconditionaxisisclear,itsposition
on the precondition axis is less so. If an assumption of consistency is made about an agent’s
PGOALs (Cohen and Levesque 1990), then conﬁrm, at least, cannot be applied from a
situation in which the agent is not permitted to bring about p (T4, T6 or T7).
Also, according to the PWAG, such a conﬁrm also entails that the agent does not believe
that the state of affairs already holds, ¬BEL(i, p). However, the PWAG is deﬁned upon a
PGOAL which requires that BEL(i,¬p). Since it can be reasonably assumed that if an agent
believes ¬p, it is not the case that it believes p, we will focus on the latter. This deﬁnition of
the conﬁrm act motivates the introduction of the third dimension to semantic space that will
be considered here: the agent may believe p or it may believe ¬p. As suggested by the KAoS
speciﬁcation, it may be useful to require that prior to an agent performing a commissive
act such that the postcondition of that act is that it moves to the normative position T5,i t
must believe ¬p. A speciﬁcation that captures the spirit of the KAoS commissive act may
be deﬁned as follows:
< i,KAoS-commit( j, p) >
FP: (T1(i, p) ∨ T2(i, p) ∨ T3(i, p)) ∧ bel(i,¬p)
RE: T5(i, p)
This is the most restricted operator (in terms of its feasibility preconditons) speciﬁed
within this section, but the question remains: how are agents to agree on the semantics of
commissive acts (or any other communicative act) used in a particular dialog? This is the
question addressed in the following section.
4. SEMANTIC FIXING
Theconceptofsemanticspaceoffersarichframeworkforcharacterizingcommunicative
action. This framework can be used in two distinct ways. Firstly, it could be used by the
designersofagentsystemsandagentcommunicationlanguagestoensurethattheirdeﬁnitions
arecomprehensiveandthattheyareawareofallthechoicestheyaremaking(andimportantly
notmaking)whentheyspecifytheindividualprimitives.Thisisanimportantcontributionand
roleinitsownright.Secondly,thesemanticspacemodelcanbeusedbytheagentsthemselves
to deﬁne or determine the semantics of their communication language at run-time. It is on
this second role that we focus in the remainder of this section.
Different situations (auctions, brokering, etc.) and classes of situations (new encoun-
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communication primitives: this, after all, is the premise from which designers of agent
communication languages are working. Rather than attempting to design a generic set of
primitives with which agents can make do in any situation, we advocate providing agents
with a means to determine precise semantics for a precise set of primitives appropriate to the
givencontext.Byﬁxingtheirownsetofcommunicationprimitives,agentsnotonlyeliminate
thepossibilityofmisunderstandings,butalsoopenupthepotentialforcomputationalsavings
(using one tailor-made primitive where otherwise, several generic acts would be required, for
example).
There is a range of processes that might be employed to carry out the task of ﬁxing
the semantics for a set of primitives. At one end of the range, there are techniques which
are fast, simple to implement, and extremely inﬂexible. It is here that languages predeﬁned
by designers belong: once the agent system is started, all semantic shift and variation is
precluded. The range and meaning of all primitives is (hopefully) well deﬁned beforehand,
and agents are obliged to use only those primitives provided by the designer.
At the next level of complexity lie mechanisms that rely on some limited bootstrapping
foundation: in order to communicate to determine the semantics of primitives, it is necessary
to have at least some primitives with which to carry out that communication. Clearly, the
semantics of these latter primitives must be determined a priori, or else the semantic ﬁxing
wouldbeunreliable.Andyet,equally,itisimportanttoavoidtheinﬁniteregressthatisloom-
ing.Apragmaticapproachsuggestsitself.Solongasthesetofbasicbootstrappingprimitives
isbothsmallandeasilydeﬁned,theoverheadrequiredseemsentirelyjustiﬁedwhenbalanced
against the gains available from dynamic semantic ﬁxing. Within this constraint, however,
thereliesanenormousvarietyofpotentialmechanisms.Onesuchisexploredindetailbelow.
As the complexity of the bootstrapping primitive set increases, so too does the potential
complexity of the mechanisms which can avail themselves of such rich communication. One
exampleistheuseofargumentationstructuressuchasthosesuggestedbyKrausetal. (1998),
Parsons and Jennings (1996), and Reed (1998). Agents use forms of ‘accept’ and ‘propose’
to exchange, critique, and incrementally develop the semantics of individual primitives.
There is a trade-off here: with rich bootstrapping primitives such as these, the mechanism
of semantic ﬁxing can be efﬁcient, ﬂexible, and fast—but it requires substantial overhead in
the initial speciﬁcation of agent communicative capabilities. If the process is to be employed
as a means of bridging existing agent societies which rely on different protocols, or as a
way of interacting with newly recruited agents with unknown communication competence,
then it is a lot to ask that any arbitrary agent should be equipped with a sophisticated set
of bootstrapping primitives. It seems more reasonable to demand that they have just one
or two simple primitives which can be reliably employed in the ﬁxing of others. With the
current diversity in agent communication languages, and the difﬁculties faced in pinning
down precisely the semantics of complex primitives, the middle point in the range appears
much more appealing.
A strong candidate for a mechanism of semantic ﬁxing which occupies a point in the
middle of the range is one based upon voting. Voting has a long tradition of being used
as a social choice mechanism for group decision making (Sandholm 1999) and the one
suggested here has the merit of being very simple. Like other mechanisms that attempt
greater ﬂexibility than that offered by a predetermined communication language, the simple
voting mechanism (SVM) makes two key assumptions. The ﬁrst is that agents share an
ontologyofsemantics.Thatis,agentscantalkaboutthemeaningsofprimitivesinacommon
language—the FIPA SL, or a KD45 logic, or whatever. A common ontology is as vital for
talking about the semantics of primitives as it is for talking about more concrete domains
such as manufacturing, e-commerce, or health care. The discussion in Sections 2 and 3,
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commonspeciﬁcationlanguageisentirelyfeasible,andsoitisarguedthatthisisareasonable
assumption,eveniffullintertranslationhasnotyetbeenachieved.Ofcourse,intime,itmight
be hoped that a common ontology of communication might be used as the native means of
describing communication primitives and hand-crafted languages. We return to potential
problems posed by the assumption of a common ontology at the end of this section.
Thesecondassumptionisthatagentsarealreadyarrangedinsomesortofgroupbywhich
they are aware of one another. The coupling of the group may be extremely loose—it may
simply be two agents at a communicative encounter, or it may be an entire society of agents.
Alternatively, the coupling may be very tight with agents in the group having agreed on joint
goals and the apportionment of responsibility. In either case, the need arises for the language
of the group to change. (The process by which such a need is identiﬁed is not our concern
here.Onemightimagineaspeciﬁedprotocolthatindicatessemanticﬁxingisappropriateata
particularstageinsomeproceedings—forexample,afteragroupofcollaboratingresearchers
decide to write a paper together, they may then always proceed to lay out rules for how drafts
are to be exchanged.)
On recognizing that a process of semantic ﬁxing is appropriate under SVM, an agent
must broadcast the fact to the other group members (to broadcast, the agent must be aware
of all the members of the group; hence assumption number two, above). This, then, is the
ﬁrst bootstrapping primitive: the ‘initiate’ broadcast. SVM dictates that agents then respond
by offering suggestions of semantic primitives. Again, we are not directly concerned with
the reasoning processes by which individual agents come up with suggestions: the SVM will
work as well with random suggestions as with those that are carefully constructed—though
of course the resulting language will have much greater ﬁt for purpose in the latter case.
However, it is important to mention one particularly signiﬁcant factor in the generation of
appropriate suggestions, namely the type of dialog that is to ensue. Though there are poten-
tially very many ways of describing the various types of dialog, one inﬂuential theory that
hasbeenshowntobeusefulincharacterizingagentdialogencountersisWaltonandKrabbe’s
dialog typology (1995). In this work, six types of dialog are distinguished: persuasion,
negotiation, deliberation, inquiry, information-seeking, and eristic. Each dialog type has
its own characteristics, assumptions, and context, all of which can be exploited in computa-
tional work (McBurney and Parsons 2001; Reed 1998). By recognizing which type of dialog
is appropriate in a given situation, it is possible to select appropriate clusters of primitives.
So for example, in the motivating example offered by Gmytrasiewicz and Huhns (2000) of
Polish- and English (only)-speaking humans successfully haggling and purchasing goods
from a Catalan (only)-speaking shopkeeper, all parties recognize that they are entering into
some sort of negotiation dialog. This immediately restricts the space of appropriate primi-
tives from which to choose to those in the propose, counterpropose and accept clusters. The
determination of precise semantics of individual primitives within those clusters is then het-
erogeneous across agents. Thus agents who are more likely to be selling will favor semantic
characterizations which reduce their own liability, at the expense of buyers.
An agent submits a suggestion by broadcasting it: the ‘suggestion’ broadcast is thus
the second bootstrapping primitive. There are no restrictions on how many suggestions for
primitives an agent may ultimately submit: the only restriction that SVM imposes is that
submissions should occur in rounds, and that at each round only a single suggestion be
adopted—the adoption is the primitive that was suggested most often (with some straightfor-
ward deterministic procedure for resolving ties). One possible mechanism for resolving such
a tie is to use a casting vote ‘token.’ Along with the initiate primitive, a sequence of agent
identiﬁers are sent that indicates the sequence in which the agents have the casting vote. This
virtual casting vote ‘token’ is passed around the group of agents involved in the SVM. The
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broadcast indicating its choice between the most popular suggestions made in that round.
This second suggestion will resolve the tie.
It may seem that with such an enormous semantic space (see below), duplicate sugges-
tions are likely to be extremely rare. However, a more careful analysis suggests that though
not homogeneous, the reasoning capabilities of agents in a group are likely to be sufﬁciently
similartoleadtypicallytosubstantialpruningofsemanticspace,andaconsequentincreasein
the likelihood of duplicate submissions. Given that agents may often select the same dimen-
sions upon which to negotiate (the Lindahlian dimensions for contract-related primitives, for
example) it is reasonable to expect substantial pruning in real situations. Ultimately though,
even in situations where this serendipitous convergence is absent, and the number of sug-
gested primitives becomes large, SVM guarantees a language that all members of the group
can share, even if it is suboptimal. Similarly, SVM and the proposed approach to negotiating
semantics in general do not presuppose any particular reasoning capabilities on the part of
the agents involved, but the more sophisticated those capabilities are, the quicker a language
might be constructed, and the better its ‘ﬁt for purpose’ when that language is subsequently
employed to solve the problems at hand.
A single round of suggestion broadcasts thus leads to the agent in the group adding a
single primitive to their language. This modiﬁcation to an agent’s language can then affect
its reasoning for the next suggestion. So, for example, if an agent had suggested a particular
variant of a ‘propose’ primitive but had been outvoted by several other members of the
group all suggesting some common alternative ‘propose,’ it is up to the agent to decide
whether or not the other ‘propose’ is adequate. If it is, then there is no need to resubmit
the initial suggestion. Alternatively it could be that the current ‘propose’ places the agent
at a disadvantage (for an agent that typically proposes, it would disadvantageous if that act
imposed severe commitments on the proposer while imposing none on the recipient, for
example). In this case, the agent may decide to resubmit the original suggestion. In any
round, an agent may submit a null, indicating contentment of the current state of the putative
language. SVM terminates at a round in which all agents submit null.
To summarize SVM, consider a ﬁnite set of agents, A,aﬁnite set of communicative acts,
C, and a subset of C that is the resulting language, L. Initially, L={ } , and some agent in
A will ‘initiate’ the procedure. Each agent in A will have a function that is used to choose
its next suggestion to be broadcast to the group: for agent a the function is choose_a().
This function will evaluate a set of communicative act speciﬁcations to either one of those
speciﬁcations or the special word null. The only restriction on the deﬁnition of this function
is that the empty set evaluates to null:
choose_a({}) = null
On receipt of a suggestion from all members of the group, each agent will check the set
of suggestions, terminate the SVM if all are null or update the language L with the most
popularprimitiveotherwise.Thesimpleprocessofdeterminingthemostpopularprimitiveis
performed by the function select-primitive() (which, as stated above, has deterministic
behavior in the case of a tie.) The valid-p() predicate function evaluates to false if a
suggestion is null, already contained in L or not contained in C. The remaining set, VALID,
then contains all suggestions that are candidates for including in L. This ﬁlter, therefore,
removes from consideration any invalid communicative act speciﬁcations. The simple voting
mechanism, therefore, operates as shown in Figure 3.
It should be clear that SVM is thus theoretically open to abuse. An agent could decide
to be entirely dogged, and repeatedly submit its own suggestions until they were all accepted
(eventually this would necessarily be the case). And yet such dogged behavior would fail to
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FIGURE 3. The simple voting mechanism.
the termination of SVM, be able to understand (have a precisely deﬁned semantics for) all
thevariouslyproposedprimitives,therewouldbenoincentivetoemployallthoseprimitives.
Assume, for example, that our dogged agent is a buyer, and has submitted a range of ‘offer’
primitives which are highly advantageous to buyers (a good example would be an ‘offer’ that
on acceptance commits a seller absolutely, while the buyer is free to continue to search out
a better deal). Sellers may simply refuse to enter communicative exchanges in which such a
biased ‘offer’ is employed. In that case, if the buyer wanted to buy, it would be obliged to use
a less skewed communication primitive.
It is clear, again, that such freedom could lead to an impasse with neither buyers nor
sellers agreeing to use a common set of primitives. This though is directly analogous to
determining a price: giving agents the ﬂexibility to negotiate over the price of a good admits
a scenario in which buyer and seller fail to reach a price upon which they both agree. If
the agents have the freedom, and are not by their own goals compelled to make the sale (or
purchase), then they may simply fail to reach an agreement in that scenario. By way of a
contrived example, if one were at liberty to negotiate whether the purchase of a particular
house in Berwick (a town on the English-Scottish border) was to be governed by the law of
Scotland (in which an accepted offer is binding, having been made through a solicitor), or
by that of England (in which a seller may “gazump” on an accepted offer if a better offer
is received), then the buyer might prefer the former, and the seller the latter. If neither were
desperate to close the deal, then it could fall through before any negotiation had taken place
at all.
The semantic ﬁxing mechanism SVM is thus a proﬂigate language construction pro-
cess, admitting any suggestion at all, though prioritizing the order in which suggestions are
accepted in the hope that it might lead agents to decide not to submit further suggestions.
Though relying for efﬁciency on the internal design of agents, SVM encourages agents to
restrict their suggestions by offering no gain for doggedness, and, in extreme cases, offering
nothing but greatly increased computational cost for individual agents who pursue strategies
of doggedness (since it is they that would be attempting to use the full gamut of primi-
tives which they had suggested). Notice that the much greater overheads involved in the
argumentation-based semantic ﬁxing mentioned above could guarantee a much more parsi-
moniouslanguageconstructionprocess,bydiligentlyassessingthesupportforadoptionofan
individual suggestion. The simplicity, speed and ease of implementation of SVM, however,
coupled with the lack of incentive for its abuse, still outweighs the problems associated with
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AlthoughSVMisaproﬂigatelanguageconstructionprocess,someremarksmaybemade
about its computational limits. It can be shown that SVM will terminate under reasonable
conditions. Suppose, in general, that semantic space has d dimensions where the average
number of discrete positions in each dimension is n.11 The initial and ﬁnal states in Figure 2
are treated as two seperate dimensions in this discussion, and these relate to the feasibility
preconditions and rational effects of a communicative act respectively. Therefore, the fact
that for each communicative act (e.g., moving from T1 to T2) there exists a symmetric act
(e.g., moving from T2 to T1) is accounted for in d. The maximum number of single-point
communicative acts that may be deﬁned in such a semantic space is, therefore, nd.F o r
example, if the semantic space consists of the two dimensions illustrated in Figure 2 (i.e., the
normative position of a single agent with respect to a single proposition before and after the
utterance), the number of primitive communicative acts is 49.
In Section 3.1, however, it was noted that there is a possibility that a communicative act
may be underspeciﬁed. This means that a single communicative act may specify a set of pos-
sible transitions in semantic space. For example, a communicative act that simply permits an
agent to bringing about p may be characterized as the set of transitions {(4,1),(6,2),(7,3)}.
Thus, the set of communicative acts where underspeciﬁcation is permitted will be the power
set of the set of primitive communicative acts. The number of such acts is 2nd
. Again, if the
semantic space is that illustrated in Figure 2, the number of possible communicative acts is
249.
A proportion of these acts are redundant; i.e., those that effect no change in the nor-
mative position of the agent concerned. The communicative action characterized by the set
of transitions {(1,1),(3,3)} is an example. Furthermore, the action characterized by the set
of transitions {(1,2),(3,3)} is equivalent to that characterized by {(1,2)}. These redundant
communicative actions occur simply because the two dimensions discussed represent the
pre- and postconditions of an action.
Assume that, for each dimension in semantic space representing a precondition of an
action there is a matching dimension representing the postcondition of that action. By way
of a further example, an agent may believe (or not) p before and after the communicative
act. In general, therefore, the number of communicative acts for a semantic space with d
dimensions, where the average number of positions on each dimension is n,i s2 nd−nd/2
.F o r
example, if the semantic space consists of the two dimensions illustrated in Figure 2, the
number of possible communicative acts is 242.
The examples used so far concern the normative position of a single agent with respect
to a single proposition before and after an utterance. A more realistic situation to consider is
when the normative positions of both speaker and hearer in a communicative exchange are
considered in semantic space. Consider, for example, the trading of options. Permission to
bring about p represents the right of the agent to buy an underlying asset at a certain time
in the future at a certain price (‘call’ the option). Holding an option also provides the agent
with the position to confer this right to others (sell or ‘put’ the option). In ‘putting’ an option,
however, the freedom of the agent toward the option is removed. The action of ‘putting’ an
option thus changes the normative state of both the speaker and the hearer. Prior to the act,
thespeaker,sayi,ispermittedtobringabout p (‘call’theoption)ortoremainpassivetoward
p (no agent, in this example, is permitted to bring about ¬p). Prior to the act, the hearer is
only permitted to remain passive. After i sells the option to j, their positions are reversed.
Thus, the act of putting an option could be characterized in the following way: the speaker, i,
11Assuming that we have a ﬁnite number of dimensions, SVM is guaranteed to terminate if n is ﬁnite. In other words,
SVM cannot be guaranteed to terminate if there is one dimension in which the number of positions that an agent can take
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moves from state 2 to 6, and the hearer, j, moves from state 6 to 2. In this case, the number
of dimensions of semantic space is four: the normative positions of the speaker and hearer
before and after the utterance. Therefore, if d = 4, the number of possible communicative
acts is 22352!
One of the criticisms that has been leveled against the process of semantic ﬁxing focuses
on the semantic space itself rather than on the process by which that space is navigated.
Inorderthatagentsareabletonegotiatemeanings,theymustshareacommonunderstanding
of semantic space: that is, the dimensions of semantic space must be available as a common
ontology. Surely, the criticism runs, such provision is far more complex than the tasks either
of designing a common language or of modeling the process of negotiating semantics. In
answering the criticism, it is ﬁrst important to note that agents need only share a common
understandingofasmallpart(thatistosay,ofasmallnumberofthedimensions)ofsemantic
space for the approach to work in a given situation. Underspecifying communication prim-
itives with respect to the dimensions of semantic space that are not shared is equivalent to
underspecifying with respect to dimensions that are shared. Thus the problem of designing
some monolithic shared ontology is reduced to the problem of ensuring that enough of the
ontology of semantic space is shared for producing a language with a good ‘ﬁt for purpose’
in the situation at hand. But this alone fails to defuse the criticism entirely: indeed, the de-
sign and implementation of even just fragments of such an ontology is undeniably a major
practical and theoretical challenge. The argument we are presenting, however, demonstrates
that the emphasis should be upon creating this common ontology of communication, rather
than upon attempting to enforce a single common language upon all agent communicative
encounters. Standardization is inevitable in a domain in which, as yet, an assumption that
agents can observe a common scene and ground their utterances in it, is simply unreason-
able. The focus of that standardization needs to be squarely upon how communication can
be described, rather than upon a library of communication primitives.
Clearly, semantic space is very rich, and supports the construction of an enormous range
ofsubtlydifferentcommunicativeacts.Thesizeoftheconstructiontaskisfullytobeexpected
if the characterization supports such a ﬁne-grained building material. The aim is to provide
agents with a system by which they can tune a language with great precision to the needs
at hand, and the ability to do this outweighs the potential pitfalls of any particular language
construction process, such as SVM. SVM is thus well suited to domains in which agents
might reasonably be expected not to suggest a huge number of different primitives. In a
domain in which this assumption was not reasonable, some other mechanism might be more
appropriate—say, one in which agents have to rank their own proposals and submit a ﬁxed
number. Of course, it would also be possible to design the construction process in such a
way that, for example, only point-based communicative primitives were to be submitted for
consideration. This would bring down the complexity dramatically (it would no longer be
necessarytoworkonthepowersetofthepointsinsemanticspace),butatthecostofrequiring
longersequencesofprimitivesintheﬁnallanguage.Thisdecouplingbetweensemanticspace
and the mechanism by which language is constructed from it is one of the advantages of the
approach.
5. EXAMPLE OF SVM
To illustrate SVM, consider three agents, each of which wish to introduce communica-
tive acts such as commands, permissive, and commissive acts into a shared communication
language. Each act speciﬁes (or partially speciﬁes) transitions of the speaker and hearer
according to the Lindahl state transitions illustrated in Figure 2. These acts are represented246 COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
here with a set of transitions for the speaker and an equivalent set for the hearer. For instance,
an act may specify that, before the act, the speaker, i, is permitted to remain passive toward
the propositional content of the act and after the act, i is committed to remain passive. In
other words, i is, before the act, in any of the Lindahl states 1, 2, or 4 and after the act in the
state 6. Thus, the set of transitions for the speaker is: {(1,6),(2,6),(4,6)}. For the hearer,
j, before the act, j is permitted to bring about p and after the act, j is committed to bring
about p. In other words, j is, before the act in any of the states 1, 2, or 3 and after the act in
the state 5. Thus, the set of transitions for the hearer is: {(1,5),(2,5),(3,5)}. This particular
communicative act results in the hearer being obliged to bringing about p and the speaker
being obliged to remain passive toward p: the hearer must bring about p and the speaker
cannot interfere. This is communicative act 3.b in the example below.
The initial state of the semantic ﬁxing between these three agents is that agents 1, 2, and
3areinterestedinthefollowingsetsofcommunicativeactsbeingincludedinthelanguage:12
Agent 1. This agent wishes to introduce two actions into the language.
1.a A command that commits the hearer to bring about p such that the hearer is not
a priori forbidden from doing so.
Speaker: {}
Hearer: {(1,5),(2,5),(3,5)}
1.b An act that commits the speaker to bring about p such that the agent is a priori
forbidden from doing so.
Speaker: {(1,5),(2,5),(3,5)}
Hearer: {}
Agent 2. This agent wishes to introduce two actions into the language.
2.a An act the permits the hearer to bring about p such that the agent is a priori
committed to remain passive.
Speaker: {}
Hearer: {(6,2)}
2.b An act that commits the hearer to remain passive toward p such that the agent is
a priori permitted to doing so or remaining passive.
Speaker: {}
Hearer: {(2,6)}
Agent 3. This agent wishes to introduce two actions into the language:
3.a A command that commits the hearer to bring about p and the speaker cannot
interfere.
Speaker: {(1,6),(2,6),(4,6)}
Hearer: {(1,5),(2,5),(3,5)}
3.b A put-option act (see Section 4 above).
Speaker: {(2,6)}
Hearer: {(6,2)}
SVM then proceeds in the following way:
Round 0. Agent 1 broadcasts initiate(1,2,3) (1-2-3 being the casting vote sequence).
The language, L is initialized.
12Each communicative act speciﬁcation refers to the changes in normative position of the agents that will take on the
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Round 1. Agent 1 has the casting vote. Agent 1 broadcasts suggestion(1.a); agent 2
broadcasts suggestion(2.a); and agent 3 broadcasts suggestion(3.a). There is a
tie. However, rather than using its casting vote to force the inclusion of 1.a, agent 1
decides to endorse agent 3’s suggestion. Agent 1 broadcasts suggestion(3.a), and so
this act is included in L.
Round 2. Agent 2 has the casting vote. Agent 1 broadcasts suggestion(1.b); agent 2
broadcasts suggestion(2.a); and agent 3 broadcasts suggestion(3.b). There is a
tie, and so the agent with the casting vote, agent 2, broadcasts suggestion(2.a). 2.a
is included in L.
Round 3. Agent 3 has the casting vote. Agent 1 broadcasts suggestion(1.b); agent 2
broadcasts suggestion(2.b); and agent 3 broadcasts suggestion(3.b). There is a
tie. Although 2.a and 2.b use the same transitions as 3.b, 3.b is being introduced for
a different purpose—for the trading of options—and so agent 3 uses the casting vote to
broadcast suggestion(3.b). 3.b is included in L.
Round 4. Agent 1 has the casting vote. Agent 1 broadcasts suggestion(1.b); agent 2
broadcasts suggestion(2.b); and agent 3 broadcasts suggestion(null). There is
a tie, and so agent 1 uses the casting vote and broadcasts suggestion(1.b). 1.b is
included in L.
Round 5. Agent 2 has the casting vote. Agent 1 broadcasts suggestion(null); agent 2
broadcasts suggestion(2.b); and agent 3 broadcasts suggestion(null). 2.b has
the only vote, and so this is included in L.
Round 6. Agent 3 has the casting vote. Agent 1 broadcasts suggestion(null); agent
2 broadcasts suggestion(null); and agent 3 broadcasts suggestion(null). SVM
terminates. L = {3.a, 2.a, 3.b, 1.b, 2.b}.
Here, suppose that agent 2 is responsible for access to an information source. The two
acts introduced by this agent, 2.a and 2.b, allow it to permit and forbid access. Although
agent 3 is not in control of this information source, it may give up its licence to access
the information source. Agent 2, the manager agent is interested in issuing commands and
allowing agents to commit to activities, hence its interest in 1.a and 1.b. It does, however,
accepttheinclusionof3.aratherthan1.a—itacceptsthatitshouldnotinterferewithagents
to whom it has given commands. This simple example illustrates the sorts of communicative
actions that can be included in a common language and how the simple voting mechanism
may be used to construct such a language. This language can be seen as a subset of a more
complete language for managing the activities of agents within an organization. Certain
relevant features of such a language are illustrated including different types of commands,
the management of information/resource access, etc.
6. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
Further analysis of Lindahl’s (1977) theory indicates that the individualistic two-agent
positions discussed above can be generalized to n-agent normative positions. Thus, in a com-
municativeexchange,anactcouldspecifythepositionspriortoandfollowingtheutteranceof
the speaker, the hearer and, for example, an agent that overhears the utterance. Collectivistic
two-agent positions—those that cannot be reduced to a conjunction of one-agent types—are
also of interest. These allow acts such as “one of you two must take out the garbage” to be
speciﬁed:O(Ei p ∨ Ej p).Suchpositionsarecommonifagroupofagentsisbeingaddressed;
see Kumar et al. (2000) for some work on communicating with groups of agents within the
KAoS framework, and Norman and Reed (2002) for a view on the logic of group-directed
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Normativesystemsspeciﬁcationhasbeenshowntobeausefulmethodinthespeciﬁcation
of multi-agent systems—for some recent work see Krogh and Herrestad (1999), Jones and
Sergot (1996), Santos et al. (1997), and Singh (1999). These authors and others emphasize
different requirements of such speciﬁcations. For example, Krogh and Herrestad (1999) and
Singh (1999) emphasize the “directedness” of norms; i.e., that certain norms are relations
between two (or more) speciﬁc agents. Sergot (1999) further analyzes Lindahl’s theory and
presents a system, Norman-G, that exploits the structure of the space or normative positions
to aid in the disambiguation of legal texts. Santos et al. (1997) investigate the possibility of
consideringactionthatisunsuccessful(thelogicofEisthatofsuccessfulaction).Normanand
Reed (2001) discuss, following von Wright (1968), the distinction between bringing about a
state of affairs and bringing about that an action is done. Each of these models, or ontologies
ofnorms,mayberelevanttothetaskofnegotiatingthesemanticsofasharedcommunication
language. The important issue, however, is that, for the agents to communicate in the ﬁrst
place they must share such an ontology. The mechanism proposed here simply allows the
agents to agree upon a number of communication primitives that capture the meaning of the
messages the exchange.
Using the agent language 3APL, Hindriks et al. (2000) initially provide a parsimonious
setofcommunicativeprimitivesonwhichtobuildtheirmodel.Theydescribetwoprimitives,
tell and ask, for information exchange, and two more, req and offer, for the exchange of a
request.Thefocusofthisworkissquarelyuponthehearerandthedeductive(forinformation)
and abductive (for requesting) logical reasoning that the hearer is able to perform after the
receipt of a message. Nevertheless, they do comment (Hindriks et al. 2000, Sec. 3) that
more complete primitive deﬁnitions can be deﬁned by introducing further constraints. Their
example is
inform(i, p) =df p?;tell(i, p)
which deﬁnes the inform by introducing a sincerity condition on the hearer in addition to
the tell primitive. They also discuss how more complex exchanges—which might in some
systems be characterized as single primitives—can be composed from the four basic acts,
taking as their example various exchanges in meeting organization.
Thus, this facet of the Hindriks et al. work can be seen as concentrating on certain
dimensions of semantic space—those characterizing the hearer’s state after the receipt of a
primitive. Each of the four basic primitive acts represent a single point within that space, and
then, by composition and by introducing further restrictions on the speaker, gives access to
a subset of the rest of the space. The precise semantic deﬁnition of the four acts, which is
one of the attractions of the work from the point of view of formal ACL design, necessarily
restricts the space that can be addressed. So for example, tell leads the hearer to update (that
is, to introduce while maintaining consistency) its belief set with the propositional content.
This is therefore a more ‘optimistic’ primitive in the inform cluster, closer to FIPA inform
than it is to KQML tell or the KAoS INF. The 3APL tell thus lies at a precise point on the
‘level of success’ axis, which precludes using it to deﬁne any of the other members of the
cluster (such as FIPA, KQML, and Cohen and Levesque), which lie at different points on
that axis.
Hindriks et al. (2000, Sec. 6) comment: “Instead of deﬁning a set of communicative
primitives corresponding to all kinds of subtle distinctions related to speech acts, we propose
to derive what kind of speech act has been performed by an agent from the characteristics of
the content proposition and the mental state of the agent.” We thoroughly agree that there are
indeed all kinds of subtle distinctions, but argue that these distinctions have real operational
value, which can be exploited by the agents themselves. To do so demands not deﬁning a set
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Finally,theworkofSteelsandKaplan(1999)tacklestheproblemoflanguageacquisition
by a group of agents by using environmental stimuli to give a grounded semantics to new
primitives.Agentsemployvideocamerastoviewacommonenvironment(awhiteboardwith
variously colored and positioned geometric shapes), and then play a ‘guessing game’ which
implements a simple form of reinforcement learning. One agent uses a primitive to describe
a feature in the environment; a hearer agent then uses past knowledge of the primitive to
guess the feature being described. Success reinforces the inferred meaning of the primitive;
failure decreases conﬁdence in a particular interpretation. The work shows that a language
evolves which has primitives of varying abstraction (e.g., “in the bottom half,”“ red and right
in the top left corner”), and also demonstrates polysemy and synonymy.
Steels and Kaplan (1999, p. 863) claim that “agents start with no prior designer-supplied
ontology nor lexicon.” However, an implicit ontology is provided, at least in terms of its
broad structure and bounds: the capabilities of the camera enforce one set of restrictions,
and the designer’s assumptions of salient features enforce another. Thus, for example, color
and position dominate the meanings of all the primitives examined, though it is the agents
themselves which do indeed determine for speciﬁc primitives the values—or, rather, sets of
values—along these axes.
Thus Steels and Kaplan (1999) focus on a speciﬁc semantic space, having axes of color
and position. The individual primitives that they discuss have either speciﬁc values on one
or more axes (“red,”“ blue and on the edge”), or have ranges of values on one or more
axes (“toward the center,”“ close to the left and toward the top”). There are several important
differencesinthewaythatprimitivemeaningsaredeterminedintheirworkandthatdescribed
inthisarticle.First,theSteelsandKaplanapproachcompetentlyhandlesaxeswithcontinuous
values. As described above, this is something which a technique like SVM would be poor at
handling,butatwhichanargumentation-basednegotiationmightbemuchbetter.Inaddition,
however, there are also several reasons why the Steels and Kaplan work would be ill suited
to the problems described in this article. First, when the meaning of primitives is deﬁned
in terms of the state of the real, observable world, feedback is a straightforward matter
(of pointing to an area of the whiteboard). When such meanings are based on mentalistic
states, normative positions, and the myriad other abstract notions which characterize much
current work in ACLs, it becomes difﬁcult to see how such direct feedback can be effected.
Secondly, Steel and Kaplan’s multi-agent system has the luxury of being able to get things
wrong for quite a long time—their graphs showing the evolution of the language have an x
axis measured in thousands of communicative exchanges. The current approach, in contrast,
offers a potential means for determining a language with good ﬁt for purpose quickly and
efﬁciently.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This article has advocated a new approach to agent communication languages. Rather
than viewing the speciﬁcation of ACLs as an off-line, design-time process, we have argued
thatinopenmulti-agentsystemsitshouldbeadynamic,run-timeprocess.Thereasonforthis
is that it enables agents that have not been designed to interoperate to come to a mutual and
explicit understanding about the semantics of their communication primitives and because
it enables agents to tailor the meaning of these primitives to the context in which they ﬁnd
themselves. The method by which agreements about the use and meaning of these primitives
canbeobtainedisoneofnegotiation.Thisisbecausetheagentsareautonomousstake-holders
and,iftheyaretointeractsuccessfully,theyneedtocometoamutuallyacceptableagreement
both on the primitives that should be used and on their semantics.250 COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
To this end, we introduced the concept of semantic space which provides, for the ﬁrst
time, a structured framework for analyzing the potential properties of agent communication
languages.Thisframeworkcanbeusedbydesignersofsuchlanguagesinordertounderstand
the full range of possibilities for their choice of communication primitives. Presently, such
design is fairly ad hoc in nature. However, the existence of a systematic framework also
opensupsimilaropportunitiesfortheagentsthemselvestocompletethisprocessatrun-time.
Thus,agentscanusetheirknowledgeofthedialogtype,theircommunicationobjectives,and
their social relationships with one another to tailor the communication language to their
prevailingcircumstances.Speciﬁcally,wearguedthatasimplevotingmechanismisthemost
appropriatemethodfororganizingthissemanticﬁxingactivityandwedetailedanappropriate
protocol that could be used for this endeavor. The proposed approach demands a common
understanding of (at least part of) semantic space shared between agents, but, we argue,
such an assumption of common understanding is both inevitable at some level, and also most
appropriately made at the level of the ontology of possible communication semantics, rather
than at the level of the semantics of a particular language.
For the future, a number of important avenues require further investigation. First and
foremost,thestructureofsemanticspace—thefragmentsofanontologyofcommunication—
need to be further developed. Section 3 of this article has demonstrated the approach, but
it needs to be applied to other dimensions, and, particularly to dimension clusters. Thus the
dimensions important to contract-related primitives, including the Lindahlian and sincerity
dimensions have been developed here. Other clusters of dimensions, for example, for in-
formation exchange, competitive bidding, and so on, need to be identiﬁed, teased apart and
added to semantic space in a coherent fashion. This enterprise will inevitably both offer
up interesting research questions, invigorating the area, and also lead to pragmatic solu-
tions in the standardization task. This mapping will invariably extend the dimensionality of
the framework and it will be interesting to observe the extent of a fully expanded space.
Second, additional types of communication primitives need to be mapped into the semantic
space framework. Third, it will be interesting to see whether this approach can be applied
to extended communication exchanges (i.e., to conversations and protocols) where many
of the same requirements about ﬂexibility, dynamism, and context awareness also apply.
Finally, the framework needs to be made operational by applying it to open communities
of agents.
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